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1. Introduction
The aim of this work is to describe the features of the chemical industry within the theoretical 
framework  of  sectoral  systems  of  innovation  and  production,  and  hence  describing  its 
knowledge  and  technological  base,  existing  complementarities  among  knowledge, 
technologies  and  products,  the  heterogeneity  of  agents,  their  learning  processes  and 
competencies,  the  role  of  non-firm  organisations,  and  the  presence  of  (co)evolutionary 
processes (Malerba, 1999). The heterogeneity of this industry, together with its one century 
history make this task difficult and interesting at the same time.
One the one hand, it results hard to reduce the different segments composing the chemical 
industry in one unique “sector”, whatever defined. Each of them has specific features, faces 
different problems, is based upon specific knowledge and technological base, and require 
companies operating within to adopt different behaviours and strategies. Previous studies that 
have  tried  to  describe  the  main  characteristics  of  the  chemical  industry  have  widely 
emphasises the heterogeneity of the industry, and the several dimensions by which it can be 
studied (among others, see Landau et al., 1998).
On the other hand, chemicals is certainly one of the oldest industries since the industrial 
revolution. The history of the chemical industry is certainly the history of large companies 
competing for size and small innovative firms, of relationships among firms and among non-
firm  institutions  (such  as  universities),  of  internationalisation  processes,  and  of  conflict 
between policy regulation (e.g., in order to face environmental problems) and competition 
through  market-based  mechanisms  (Aftalion,  1999).  Compared  to  other  fascinating,  but 
younger  industries  (e.g.,  computers,  semi-conductors  or  telecommunications)  it  can  offer 
significant examples of possible evolutionary and co-evolutionary processes. For instance, 
processes of technology diffusion and transfer which are characterising the late development 
of the semi-conductor industry can be usefully compared with those operating in chemicals 
since the 1960s, and that gave rise to the market for process technologies.
However, one of the main features of the chemical sectoral system is the role played by the 
knowledge dimension, and processes of knowledge creation and exploitation. Mostly on this 
dimension has been played in the past and is played even today the competitive challenge 
between firms, and between countries and regions. It is true that firm size is important as well. 
Many chemical companies have to increase their size in order to sustain the big effort of 
marketing and reaching markets geographically dispersed, and in order to spread the huge 
fixed costs of plants’ setting or product development. However, innovation often remain the 
real critical point. It is because of the efficient organisation of innovative activity and the 
strict links with universities and engineering departments that German chemical companies in 
the  early  XX  century  became  world  leaders.  And  is  because  of  innovative  effort  that 
companies can efficiently compete in the new specialty products markets. Again, is because 
of  the  capability  of  producing  “green”  products  and  developing  less  pollutant  process 
technologies  that  chemical  companies  can  satisfy  stricter  and  stricter  limits  imposed  by 
environmental regulation.
Hence, after having described the main features of the sectoral system in chemicals – sector 
boundaries, agents and relationships among agents, geography of the sector and issues of 
international performances, industry dynamics and evolutionary patterns – this study will 
focus  its  attention  mostly  on  describing  the  processes  of  creation,  diffusion  and  use  of 
knowledge and its structure. On the one hand, the analysis will take into consideration the 
processes of development of technological competencies, and of creation of technological - 3 -
knowledge.  This  phase  is  particularly  important,  because  non-firm  institutions,  such  as 
universities and laboratories, enter to play. Furthermore, in order to better explore these 
processes, the level of the analysis will be shifted in this case from the firm to the single 
inventors. In particular, the organisational proximity within the firm will be compared with 
the geographical proximity within the technological clusters, as organisational modes for 
producing innovations.
On the other hand, we will explore the processes of technology transfer and diffusion. Indeed, 
the chemical sectoral system is characterised by a dense network among different agents, both 
chemical firms, specialised suppliers and engineering firms. The objective of this network is 
to exchange technologies (mainly process technologies), and, in some sense, it is possible to 
observe the emergence of a market for (process) technologies. The actual functioning of this 
market is strictly linked with the licensing activity promoted by larger firms, and at the same 
time firms’ decision to license out their proprietary technologies depends upon the existence 
of  such  a  market.  Hence,  the  understanding  of  firms  technological  strategies  becomes 
important in order to analyse causes and consequences of the market for technologies in 
chemicals.
The study is organised as follows. It is mostly composed of two main parts. The first (sections 
2 to 4), tries to describe the chemical industry by means of the framework of sectoral systems. 
Explicitly, Section 2 defines the general boundaries of the chemical sectoral system, in terms 
of its dimension, its tradition in innovation and R&D activities, the linkages between this 
sector and downstream sectors, and the innovative patterns existing in this industry. Section 3 
explores the geographical dimension of the sector and addresses the question of whether it is 
useful discussing of international performance, and what factors play a role in this respect. 
Section 4 analyses the evolution of industry organisation, and of co-evolutionary processes, 
by paying special attention to the environmental topic.
While the first part is mainly descriptive, the second part reports some original empirical 
findings. It focuses its attention on processes of knowledge creation and diffusion. So, section 
5 explores the phase of knowledge development. By means of a patent analysis, it compares 
the firm and the cluster as different organisational modes for producing innovations. Section 6 
focuses on the processes of technology diffusion and licensing, after that innovations have 
been developed. After having discussed the conditions that brought to the upsurge of a market 
for technologies in chemicals, it provides some empirical evidence of the latter, and highlights 
the  role  of  firms’  licensing  behaviour  in  the  development  of  such  a  market.  Section  7 
concludes the paper.
2. Defining the boundaries of the sector
2.1 Industry structure and corporate strategies
The  chemical  sector  is  a  large  and  heterogeneous  sector  (Cook  and  Sharp,  1992).  The 
heterogeneity, the size of the industry, its scientific tradition, and the linkages with many 
other  industries  and  products  are  important  characteristics  of  the  sector.  They  strongly 
influence industry structure and firms’ technology strategies.
As for heterogeneity, chemical products range from bulk chemicals – or basic or commodity 
chemicals – to speciality chemicals. Basic chemicals are high quantity and low value-added - 4 -
products characterised by low differentiation. By contrast, speciality products such as dyes 
and  paints,  food  additives  and  photographic  materials  are  more  differentiated  and 
sophisticated products. They are also produced in low volumes, and sold for high prices. This 
heterogeneity mirrors completely different technological, scientific and R&D strategies by 
individual sub-sectors and firms.
As far as size is concerned, the chemical sector is today the largest manufacturing industry in 
the United States, and the second largest in Europe. It produces about 1.9% of the US gross 
domestic product and about 11.3% of US manufacturing value-added (Arora, Landau and 
Rosenberg, 1998). In 1999, the European chemical industry produced about 2,4% of the 
European  gross  domestic  products,  and  contributed  to  the  European  total  manufacturing 
production with a share of about 9.7%.
1 In terms of value added, the chemical industry ranked 
third within the EU manufacturing industry. The order of magnitude of these percentages is 
similar for Japan. From a global perspective, in 1996 the US chemical industry had about 
24% of the global market. Japan was second with 14%. The market share of Germany and 
Britain was 8% and 4%, respectively. The rest of chemical production is spread across the rest 
of Western Europe and Asia. Twelve of the largest chemical multinational companies are 
European (Cook and Sharp, 1992).
Another important characteristic of the chemical sector is its long tradition in innovation and 
R&D activities. Since its origins in the second half of the XIX century with the British and 
German dyestuff manufacturers, the chemical sector is a science-based sector. Innovation in 
this  industry  derives  from  the  interaction  between  the  academic  world,  individual  firms, 
government  economic  policies,  and  historical  events.  Empirical  work  has  shown  the 
importance  of  the  linkages  between  internal  R&D  capabilities  and  external  sources  of 
scientific knowledge for successful innovation (among others, see Freeman et al., 1963). 
Universities and small firms are key for carrying out basic research and developing product 
innovations.  Firms’  in-house  R&D  is  the  essential  complement  to  exploiting  external 
linkages. This strong linkage between university research and firms’ innovative activity is 
particularly  important  even  today,  especially  in  new  fields.  Recent  studies  using  patent 
statistics  (Geuna,  2000),  show  that  in  emerging  fields  like  combinatorial  chemistry  the 
contribution of basic research – from universities and other public research centres – to 
industrial  innovation  is  essential.  With  consequences  that  will  be  better  explored  in  the 
following sections, the strong interaction between academic research and industrial innovative 
activity clearly influences international performances. In the case of combinatorial chemistry, 
the US lead in firm formation is paralleled by the dominant role played by US universities and 
research centres. While EU countries are catching up in terms of university publishing, the 
number  of  new  combinatorial  synthesis  firms  in  Europe  remain  very  small.  Hence,  the 
inventive  capacity  of  a  country  heavily  depends  upon  the  strength  of  the  underlying 
universities and public research institutes.
Private firms were also the major source of R&D funding and the locus of technological 
applications. Today, the firm average R&D intensity in the chemical sector is about 5%, 
which is higher than the average R&D intensity in other sectors. In fields like pharmaceuticals 
and  biotechnology,  firms’  R&D  intensity  may  exceed  20%.  All  the  major  technological 
innovations in the 1920s and 1930s –  such  as  polystyrene,  perspex,  PVC,  polyethylene, 
synthetic rubbers, nylon and other artificial fibres – were developed in the laboratories of 
                                                          
1 See the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) web page: http://www.cefic.be/activities/eco/ff99/01-
11.htm.- 5 -
large  chemical  companies,  most  of  which  still  exist  today  (e.g.  DuPont,  Bayer,  BASF, 
Hoechst, and ICI, among the most influential).
Another  important  feature  of  the  chemical  industry  is  that  more  than  50%  of  chemical 
products are intermediate goods used by a wide range of industrial sectors (Albach et al., 
1996). More than 70,000 products like paints and coatings, fertilisers, pesticides, solvents, 
plastics, synthetic fibres and rubber, explosives and many others are building blocks at every 
level of production and consumption in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and in the 
service  sectors.  Put  differently,  the  chemical  sector  is  the  upstream  sector  providing 
intermediates  for  several  downstream  users.  Moreover, since successful innovations have 
positive effects in many downstream industries, the chemical sector is also an important 
source of knowledge spillovers and technology diffusion.
The  strategies  and  the  innovative  decisions  of  chemical  firms  are  dependent  upon  the 
characteristics of the branch of the industry in which they operate. For example, products 
heterogeneity leads chemical firms to follow strategies of cost leadership or specialisation 
depending upon the products being produced (Porter, 1985). Firms adopt a cost leadership 
strategy in areas characterised by price competition. This is the case of basic chemicals. By 
using information drawn from the Community Innovation Survey, Albach et al. (1996) show 
that during the past few years, European firms in commodity chemicals focussed on cost 
leadership  strategies.  In  so  doing they increasingly concentrated in their core areas, and 
engaged in strategic alliances with other companies. By contrast, firms in the specialty sectors 
tended to pursue specialisation strategies characterised by great product differentiation and 
customisation, and higher profit margins. 
In turn, the decision to follow cost leadership or specialisation strategies influences firms’ 
innovative behaviour. Cost leadership leads companies to promote process innovations in 
order to reduce the cost of production. By contrast, specialisation strategies require companies 
to focus on product innovations, in order to better respond to customers’ needs, and to set 
higher prices. Albach et al. (1996) show that in agrochemicals, paints and varnishes – i.e. 
speciality products – more than 60% of firms allocate at least 75% of their R&D budgets to 
product innovations. The share of companies devoting 75% of total R&D expenditure to 
product innovation falls to about 30% in basic chemicals. However, firms producing basic 
chemicals spend about 75% of their R&D budget on process innovations. This survey also 
suggests that companies are increasingly entering into strategic alliances in the area of R&D, 
both with other firms, and with academic and research institutions. Again, however, the use of 
cooperative arrangements varies according to the sector. Companies from the agrochemical 
sector have the highest propensity to R&D collaboration. The opposite holds for firms in soap 
and detergents. Cooperation with universities, government laboratories, and other research 
institutions is frequent for companies from basic chemicals and man-made fibres.
2.2 Sectoral innovative patterns
The existing studies on the chemical industry highlight the long tradition in innovation and 
R&D  in  the  sector  (see,  for  example  Landau et  al.,  1998).  This  section  describes  how 
discoveries and innovations are developed in the chemical sectoral system, and illustrate the 
organisation of the innovative process and its evolution over time. It also discusses how 
“upstream” features of the industry affect firms’ strategies and industry structure. Notice that 
industry  structure,  firms’  strategies  and  behaviour,  and  the  organisation  of  innovative 
activities of today are the result of the evolution of the industry over one century history. - 6 -
Hence, to fully understand the modern chemical industry it becomes essential to recall the 
main past events, whose effects are visible yet today.
The modern chemical industry started in Great Britain in the first half of the XIX century, 
when the first inorganic chemical firms emerged. However, although the industry started by 
producing inorganic products – such as soda, soda ash and blench – the engine of growth was 
represented by organic chemistry, particularly dyestuff. As a matter of fact, due to the rapid 
pace  of  technological  change  in  organic  chemistry,  firms  changed  their  approach  to 
innovation. They started to adopt innovative strategies based on the methodical application of 
scientific discoveries to chemical manufacture. 
The synthetic-dyestuff model is a meaningful example of the new approach to innovation. Its 
main feature is the use of the scientific base for developing new products and processes. 
Advances  in  the  scientific  principles  governing  organic  chemistry  provided  a  good 
understanding  of  how  carbon  atoms  were  linked  to  hydrogen  and  other  atoms  to  form 
complex molecules. This knowledge was the beginning of the development of a “general 
purpose  technology”  based  upon  the  idea  that  different  chemical  composites  could  be 
designed by using the scientific background on the properties associated with atoms, and 
bounds among atoms. 
The  direct  implication  of  the  synthetic-dyestuff  model  was  the  possibility  of  exploiting 
economies of scope in knowledge: a common scientific base on atoms and bounds properties 
was the necessary background in order to develop different organic products. Firms that could 
master this knowledge had a strong incentive to diversify their product portfolio in sectors 
that share the common scientific base, like pharmaceuticals, explosives, and photographic 
materials.
2
A second implication of the application of the synthetic-dyestuff model has been the resurge 
of the role of universities and other scientific research institutes. Being the synthetic-dyestuff 
model a science-based model in which the invention of new products was strictly dependent 
upon advances in the scientific understanding of the chemical structure of new molecules, the 
largest  and  most  innovative  firms  established  strong  links  with  the  academia.  Chemical 
companies  began  to  recruit  researchers  in  the  universities,  and  promoted  research 
collaborations aimed at inventing new products. They also applied for joint patents, and 
promoted  alliances  with  universities  to  set  up  special  research  institutes  (Murmann  and 
Landau, 1998).
However, the synthetic-dyestuff model was only the beginning of the science-based approach 
to innovation in chemicals. The continuation of the synthetic-dyestuff model was polymer 
chemistry. Initiated by Herman Staudinger and other German scientists in the 1920s, polymer 
chemistry is based upon the idea that any material consists of long chains of molecules – i.e. 
polymers – linked together by chemical bounds. The scientific understanding of the existence 
and configuration of these long chemical macromolecules led to the principle of “materials by 
design” (Arora and Gambardella, 1998). According to this principle, it exists a relationship 
between the characteristics of the macromolecular structures and the proprieties of materials. 
This means that the scientific understanding of chemical composites is the base for different 
product applications.
                                                          
2 This was the case of Hoechst, that in 1883 produced the pain-relieving Antipyrin, and Bayer, that in 1899 
patented  the  pain-relieving,  fever-reducing,  anti-inflammatory  Aspirin.  AGFA  used  the  same  technological 
convergence of some organic intermediates and in 1887 diversified in photochemicals.- 7 -
As in the case of the dyestuff model, the rise of polymer chemistry strongly influenced the 
evolution of the chemical sector in the post-war era. The reasons are twofold. First, polymer 
chemistry provided a common technological base for developing applications and product 
differentiation in five distinct and otherwise unconnected product markets – i.e. plastics, 
fibres, rubbers and elastomers, surface coatings and paintings, and adhesives. This lowered 
the amount of time and research needed for product innovation in the sector. But, if the use of 
abstract principles governing the macromolecular structures offered the solution to “how” to 
innovate, the question shifted to “what” to produce. In other words, while the process of 
producing new products was comparatively easier for any chemical firm, the discovery of the 
“right product” was not. Competition among firms shifted to the correct anticipation of the 
users’ requirements, and to the development of the most suitable applications. This meant 
that, to innovate successfully, firms had to become knowledgeable about the characteristics of 
different market segments. To do so, they developed extensive linkages with the downstream 
markets.
Second,  the  new  opportunities  created  by  polymer  chemistry  were  exploited  by  a  large 
number of companies world-wide which had the required size, the scope, and the in-house 
expertise to exploit it. As Freeman (1982) points out, the presence of a large number of firms 
with comparable capabilities in polymers implied that even “small” information leaks allowed 
very rapid imitation. Many chemical companies and some oil producers found themselves 
competing  in  very  similar  markets.
3  The  increased  competition  in  almost  every  market 
segment led to a renewed attention to product differentiation and commercialisation strategies 
as important sources of competitive advantage. This encouraged extensive investments in 
R&D to develop new product variants, and systematic linkages with the users in order to 
tailor products for specific applications.
The shift from coal to petroleum hydrocarbons, started in the years before the Second World 
War in the US, was the main reason for a new, radical change in the innovative patterns in 
chemicals. Indeed, the world-wide diffusion of petrochemical technologies was strongly due 
to the upsurge of chemical engineering.
The concept of unit operation  presented by Arthur D. Little to the Corporate of MIT 
(Massachusetts Institute for Technology) in 1915 was key to the development of chemical 
engineering.  The  idea  of  the  unit  operation  consists  in  the  breaking  down  of  chemical 
processes into a limited number of basic components or distinctive processes that are common 
to many product lines (Wright, 1998).
4 This abstract and general concept became the “general 
purpose  technology”  of  the  chemical  sector,  and  provided  the  unifying  base  for  more 
contextualised  and  problem-solving  innovations  at  the  plant  level  (Rosenberg,  1998). 
Furthermore, it made possible to separate product innovation from process innovation, hence 
leading to important changes in the organisation of the chemical sector.
First, process technology was made into a commodity that could be traded.
5 This allowed 
chemical technologies to diffuse rapidly and easily. Strong economies of specialisation were 
                                                          
3 For instance, Union Carbide, Goodrich, general Electric, IG Farben, and ICI were all doing research in PVC 
and producing the polymer. Dow, IG Farben, and Monsanto were all involved in the polystyrene business. Du 
Pont, ICI, Union Carbide, Monsanto, Kodak, and many other firms invested in other types of polyamides, 
acrylics and polyesters (Spitz, 1988; Aftalion, 1989).
4 See Rosenberg (1998) for the discussion of the “unit operation”, and the role of MIT in the development of the 
chemical engineering discipline.
5 This point will be discussed in Section 6.- 8 -
achieved  at  the  industry-level,  and  a  large  number  of  vertical  linkages  were  developed
between  chemical  companies  and  Specialised  Engineering  Firms  (hereafter  SEFs).  These 
vertical ties often resolved into partnering relationships of two types: between the SEFs and a 
number of chemical firms developing new technologies; and between the SEFs and an even 
larger number of firms buying these new technologies. As Freeman (1968, p.30) points out, in 
the period 1960-1966 “(N)early three quarters of the major new plants were ‘engineered’, 
procured and constructed by specialist plant contractors”, and the SEFs were the source of 
about  30%  of  all  licenses  of  chemical  processes.  By  supplying  the  necessary  process 
technologies, the design and the engineering know-how of new plants, the SEFs facilitated 
entry of new firms into the chemical industry after the Second World War, and allowed other 
countries such as Germany to catch up quickly in petrochemicals. 
A second effect of the introduction of the unit operation concept and the rise of the chemical 
engineering  discipline  was  the  renewal  importance  of  university  research  for  developing 
innovations. The academic research assured the orientation toward general results. The link of 
the university with the industry, and its partial dependence upon private industry funding, 
assured  the  focus  on  industrial  needs.  Moreover,  in  order  to  develop  many  processing 
technologies, and to achieve meaningful results, chemical engineers needed the large scale 
operations of the chemical firms, that the university alone could not supply.
6
This  interaction  between  profit-seeking  institutions  and  independent  or  semi-independent 
professional  scientists  influenced  the  evolution  of  technology  in  engineering  discipline. 
Threatened by the possibility of going to the academy as a potential employment option, firms 
often  had  to  adapt  their  employment  conditions  to  match  those  typically  found  at  the 
university. In so doing they allowed a certain degree of freedom and flexibility to chemical 
scientists and engineers, and gave the possibility to publish their research achievements. In 
the US, this might have limited corporations’ ability to appropriate knowledge, and to channel 
new technologies. By contrast, Germany resisted chemical engineering as an autonomous 
discipline until the 1960s, and drew a clear demarcation line between subjects to be studied at 
the university, and those of more immediate usefulness of the industry. Also the British ICI 
showed limited interest in university-trained engineers up to the Second World War. Only 
when Britain entered the refining market, the demand for chemical engineers grew rapidly.
To sum up, the three examples of synthetic-dyestuff, polymer chemistry and unit operation 
along with chemical engineering illustrate how the organisation of innovative activities in 
chemicals has relied on the application of general scientific knowledge to the discovering of 
new products and processes. This approach to innovation has let to major changes in firms’ 
strategies and market structures, some of which have been explored in this section.
3. Geography of the chemical sectoral system and international performance
In  analysing  the  geographical  dimension  and  international  performance  of  the  chemical 
industry one cannot forget that the chemical industry has always been “global”. This means 
                                                          
6 An important example of university-industry networks in this period is that between the New Jersey Standard 
and the MIT at the research facility in Baton Rouge, Louisiana (Landau and Rosenberg, 1992). The PhD degree 
came to play a role in chemical engineering much earlier than in other engineering disciplines. No longer after 
the beginning of the discipline, the enrolment of graduate students in chemical engineering grew rapidly. At the 
time of the presentation of the “unit operation”, the consulting company of Arthur D. Little employed a large 
number of MIT graduates.- 9 -
that not only the national dimension might not be relevant in the analysis of competitiveness, 
but the multinational dimension (Europe vs. US, for example) might not be enough as well.
The “global” dimension of the chemical sector can be analysed in terms of investment flows. 
For many years the industry has shown considerable flows on international investments, and 
systematic  flows  of  engineering  and  process  licenses.  While  up  to  the  1980s  foreign 
investments were to a large extent confined to first world countries, in the recent decades 
there has been an increase in the flows towards the developing countries as well. As a matter 
of fact, chemical investments in these countries have become a critical strategy of the major 
multinational chemical firms from the advanced world, and to some extent the ability to 
invest in these countries has become a major factor in enhancing their competitiveness, and 
more generally an important element for competition in the industry. Moreover, apart from 
foreign direct investments in plants, the developing countries have become important areas 
for inflows of process licenses and engineering services. Again, the competitiveness of the 
chemical firms in advanced countries is often related to their ability to operate and invest in 
these  markets,  as  well  as  on  their  ability  to  complement  these  investments  with  related 
technology flows through licenses or engineering services.
While this trend has characterised chemical companies both from Europe, the US and Japan, 
it seems that European companies have benefited more of international investments. The 
European chemical industry ranks first in the world in terms of turnover, but there is a 
considerable  concern  the  European  industry  is  loosing  ground.  The  smaller  and  more 
fragmented European market have encouraged European firms to invest abroad, while facing 
high labour cost in Europe.
Analyses of investment flows (Arora, Garcia-Fontes and Gambardella, 1998) show that the 
European chemical industry has indeed moved abroad its investments. However, the same can 
be said for the American and Japanese chemical industry. This means that there has been an 
increasing globalisation process for this industry, that can be translated into a significant 
increase in the number of chemical plants built in Asia, coupled with a decrease of the 
domestic share of Japanese of the domestic share of Japanese firms in Japan, American firms 
in the US and European firms in the European Union. In general, it can be said that there is a 
trend toward the location of plants near the customers and the fast-growing regions, where the 
demand and consumption may be stronger. This trend might be related to an increase in 
product differentiation and customisation of plants, together with an increased concern on 
reducing transport costs. However, as far as the European dimension is concerned, there is 
some evidence that the process is stronger for the chemical firms from the European Union. 
These  firms  have  been  major  actors  in  the  increase  in  investments  in  Asia,  and  in  the 
reduction of shares for domestic firms in the US and Japan. Indeed, the trend for the location 
of European firms in North America, Japan and Asia is stronger than the trend of American 
and Japanese firms locating in Europe.
In terms of products, the main products for the shift of investments to Asia have been Organic 
Chemicals Refining, Petrochemicals and Plastics & Rubber. In general, during the 1980s, the 
largest share of plants belonged to Organic Chemicals Refining, while during the 1990s, it 
shifted to Plastics & Rubber and Petrochemicals.
The  sectoral  dimension  of  globalisation  process  is  particularly  important.  The  case  of 
specialty chemicals is representative in this respect (Sharp, 2001). In specialty chemicals, 
what  were  national  companies  competing  as  oligopolists  in  predominantly  national  or - 10 -
regional (e.g., European) markets have become international companies competing against 
each  other  in  the  global  market  place.  This  has  important  implications.  The  process  of 
specialisation via merger and acquisition – consider the de-merger of Zeneca from ICI, the 
merger o Zeneca with Astra, of Ciba Geigy with Sandoz, of ICI with Unilever, of Hoechst 
with Rhone Poulenc – has essentially meant that what was national or regional oligopoly has 
been transformed into global oligopoly. In each sector, competition involves no more than six 
to twelve large firms that dominate the market, but that market place is now global. New 
entrants need to compete both in terms of scale and marketing, but, because of the size on 
incumbents and their financial and organisational strength, it is in marketing that new entrants 
find it most difficult to compete. This means that, in spite of intense global competition, it is 
still possible for one or two firms to dominate in each national market place, because they 
possess  dominant  complementary  assets  in  marketing  and  effectively  control  access  to 
consumers.
Hence, what does international performance means? How can be assessed the importance, or 
competitiveness, or performance of the chemical industry at the national level? In general 
terms, it seems that countries or regions’ performance and competitiveness is strictly linked to 
the presence of large multinational companies, which, in turn, is related to the presence of 
national  or  regional  characteristics  involving  local  demand,  research  capabilities,  and 
scientific and technological knowledge base. Large firms move and locate their production 
plants and their R&D facilities according to the presence of these factors. Consideration on 
investments  flows  reported above respond to this scheme. On a different dimension, the 
comparison between US and European chemical industry can also be conducted in terms of 
the respective capability of translating public research in commercial innovations. Of course, 
differences emerge in this respect in sub-sectors also within the chemical industry.
The  considerations  discussed  above  on  combinatorial  chemistry  and  environmental 
technologies  go  in  this  direction.  Moreover,  in  the  agrochemical  industry,  the  current 
discovery process of new agrochemicals requires the integration of various distinct scientific 
disciplines. Europe shows a healthy publication level in fields necessary to the agrochemical 
sector. However, patent levels and the number of products introduced is low indicating that 
Europe  has  difficulty  in  bringing  its  research  to  market.  Contrary  to  scientifically  more 
dynamic industries, in paints, coatings and printing inks industries, European firms seem in a 
better position. For instance, from a technological point of view, the industry seems to be 
perfectly capable of coping with the diffusion of new, solvent free formulations, although it is 
quietly difficult to find differences between US and EU firms. In the new materials subsector 
the research effort is mainly public, as the private sector seems to wait for commercial 
potential. However, large firms have been the main source of incremental innovation with an 
important  cumulative  impact.  These  incremental  developments  are  coming  from  the 
laboratories  of  these  large  firms,  although  frequently  working  in  conjunction  with  users 
and/or outside specialists from academia or specialist firms, with differences among countries 
in the availability of these two factors. In sum, the scientific and technological base plays a 
key role in defining competitive positions of different countries and regions in different sub-
sectors, because they represent a strong incentive for large multinational companies to locate 
in specific national boundaries.
7
                                                          
7 As reported by Sharp (2001), “the presence of Hoechst, Bayer and BASF, together with the close competition 
from  Sandoz,  Ciba  Geigy  and  Hoffman  la  Roche  in  Switzerland,  was  seen  to  provide  the  basis  for  the 
comparative (competitive) advantage of Germany and Switzerland in chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Britain’s 
support for a ‘cluster’ of pharmaceutical firms was likewise seen to have brought the UK competitive advantage 
in this sector”. However, “[n]ational competitiveness can be seen not so much in the performance of nationally-- 11 -
In this sense, national policies might play a partial role. If they are capable of providing 
education, training and an infrastructure supportive to science-based industries they will be 
capable of offering a critical contribution to this kind of competitiveness, because they will 
create the conditions by which MNEs might decide to locate some of their divisions. Regions 
that will be able to become centres of information, communication and knowledge application 
will attract more knowledge-intensive MNEs (Meyer-Krahmer, 1999). Examples of Ireland 
and India in the case of software and semi-conductors are representative of this pattern.
4. Evolutionary and co-evolutionary processes
4.1 Industry dynamics: the evolution of networks formation
One of the possible solutions for describing the dynamics of industry structure is to move 
from a firm-level to a network-level approach. Linkages among firms, research institutions, 
and users are an important feature of the chemical sector. Their characteristics evolved and 
influenced the evolution of the industry according to the specific historical circumstances. 
Although inter-firm networks, university-industry networks, and user-producer networks are 
common to any period, each of them is mainly associated to specific historical events. This is 
because they aim at achieving different objectives. Inter-firm networks include firm-to-firm 
strategic agreements for R&D, production and marketing. University-industry networks are 
firm-to-academy  linkages  aimed  at  developing  basic  innovations.  Finally,  user-producer 
networks are linkages that firms develop in order to be responsive to their customers’ needs, 
especially in the more downstream specialty sectors.
During the XIX century, when the synthetic-dyestuff model emerged, the invention of new 
products was strictly related to some advances in scientific understanding of the chemical 
structure of new molecules. The role of universities and other scientific research institutes was 
extremely relevant. The largest and most innovative firms established different links with 
these agents. A type of university-industry interaction was the recruitment of researchers in 
companies’  organisations.  But  many  other  different  kinds  of  links  were  promoted  like 
research collaborations aimed at inventing new products, and applying for joint patents.
At  the  same  time,  the  dyestuff  model  imposed  the  establishment  of  strong  interactions 
between firms and users, not only for technical reasons. The strong interaction with the users 
allowed dyes firms to better understand customers’ needs, and produce products better suited 
to  a  diversified  demand.  R&D  activity  benefited  widely  from this  type  of  interaction,  a 
continuous stream of product innovation could be ensured, and chemical firms could achieve 
a competitive advantage.
The World War I brought deep changes in the structure of the international chemical industry, 
and in the behaviour of firms. In order to satisfy the war needs, governments played a strong 
influence on the demand side of chemical products. The demand for explosives, drugs, and 
fertilisers  during  the  war  allowed  chemical  firms  to  utilise  completely  their  production 
capabilities. But, when the war stopped, and the reconstruction period ended, the demand for 
chemical products decreased in all countries. Most chemical producers suffered during the 
inter-war  period  of  overcapacity  problems,  that  imposed  a  rationalisation  of  the  whole 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
based MNEs, as in the degree to which international companies are drawn to locate within national boundaries, 
and the quality of the jobs they bring with them and attract to them”.- 12 -
chemical industry. The increase in the number of mergers, acquisitions (e.g., IG Farben in 
Germany, and of ICI in Britain) and cartels (e.g., the Nitrogen Cartel between IG Farben and 
ICI) was the natural response to the pressures for cost reductions in all countries. Networks in 
this period became synonymous of collusion.
After the World War II two major technological breakthroughs influenced the formation of 
networks and industry structure. We already explored these changes from the technological 
viewpoint  in  the  previous  section.  On  the  one  hand,  polymer  chemistry  encouraged  the 
formation  of  networks  between  producers  and  users  of  chemical  products.  Indeed, 
competition among firms shifted to the correct anticipation of users’ requirements, and to the 
development of the most suitable applications. This meant that, to innovate successfully, 
firms had to become knowledgeable about the characteristics of different market segments. 
On the other hand, chemical engineering encouraged the formation of university-industry 
linkages,  and  the  development  of  vertical  networks  between  chemical  companies  and 
specialised  process  design  and  engineering  contractors  (SEFs).  In  turn,  the  process  of 
increasing specialisation and cumulative learning in process design was the basis of SEFs’ 
comparative advantages in developing this “market for chemical technologies”. They supplied 
the necessary process technologies, the design and the engineering know-how of new plants. 
As a consequence, the chemical industry resulted in an increasing division of labour at the 
industry level between SEFs and chemical manufacturers.
A final discontinuity in industry dynamics can be observed during the 1980s. The rise of the 
SEFs fostered competition in the chemical sector, and led to a substantial increase of chemical 
firms in most markets. During the 1950s and 1960s, the industry could accommodate such 
increase because demand for chemical products was growing rapidly. But, in the 1970s and 
1980s, the oil shocks, the entry of competitors from the developing countries, the slower 
demand growth, the diminishing opportunities for product innovation made the profitability 
decline become a severe problem. Firms in a large number of chemical markets, especially 
basic intermediates, experienced excess-capacity.
As in the first post-war period, the restructuring process involved also a large number of inter-
firm networks, both in production and R&D. The formation of inter-industry associations 
(e.g., the Association of Petrochemicals Producers in Europe) played a role in fostering such 
inter-firm agreements. Furthermore, mergers and acquisitions, and alliances were typically a 
means to reduce the number of businesses in which the chemical companies were active, and 
to increase the absolute size and the market share of their remaining product lines.
To  sum  up,  during  its  one  hundred  years  history,  the  chemical  industry  faced  radical 
discontinuities, both in the technological and market-side. It is worth noting, however, that 
changes in networks formation were the natural answer that allowed chemical firms to survive 
for such a long period. If the industry faced a series of big discontinuities, it faced a long 
continuity in companies’ life as well, and networks were probably the means by which firms 
adapted to radical changes.
4.2 Co-evolutionary processes: the case of  environmental technologies
The  heterogeneity  of  composition  of  the  chemical  sectoral  system  in  terms  of  industry 
segments  makes  the  discussion  about  co-evolutionary  processes  peculiar.  Although  the 
different elements of the sectoral system – demand, agents, technology, learning processes, 
markets, and institutions – are closely connected in chemicals, and their change over time - 13 -
often results in processes of co-evolution, these processes have not the same very nature in all 
different segments of the industry and, even more important, it might be hard to identify an 
unique co-evolutionary process for the industry as a whole.
For instance, a clear example of co-evolution of markets, institutions, agents and new agents 
coming into play can be found in the case of chemical processing technologies in developing 
countries. Since the second post-war period, developing countries have been a constantly 
increasing demander of process technologies in order to satisfy the needs of internal chemical 
industry. Demand of process technologies was mostly directed to the production of new 
fertilisers  for  the  agricultural  sector,  and  to  provide  an  effective  utilisation  of  large  oil 
resources available in many developing countries. On the other hand, chemical companies 
from developed countries were interested in enlarging their final market by expanding in 
emerging countries. In this situation, local governments often came into play, opening local 
barriers to foreign firms, but asking them to provide processing technologies to local chemical 
companies. As a consequence, process technologies flowed from developed to developing 
countries,  with  SEFs  being  the  main  actors  of  this  market  together  with  large  chemical 
companies.  In  sum,  it  was  the  interplay  and  mutual  evolution  of  large  companies  and 
engineering firms from developed countries, with new entrants and local authorities from 
emerging countries, to allow both the markets for chemical products in developing countries 
and the market for process technologies in developed countries to grow.
However, the most interesting example of co-evolutionary process in chemicals is probably 
related to the environmental topic.
8 The chemical industry has often been accused of being 
highly  responsible  for  pollution,  and  chemical  firms,  before  others,  have  been  highly 
committed to solve environmental problems. Some relevant accidents (e.g. Seveso, Bhopal) 
have contributed to generate a diffuse suspicion against chemical firms and the industry as a 
whole. Hence, one first element characterising the environmental issue in chemicals is related 
to the demand-side, and refers to the greater attention paid by consumers to pollution and 
environmental problems. Consumers’ behaviour in this sense often resulted in the rise of new 
markets  for  environmentally-safe,  less  pollutant  products,  which  have  grown  with  some 
differences in terms of intensity in all developed countries.
At the same time, a second element entering into play has been government interventions. 
Governments have paid greater attention to pollution, and have subsequently tried to impose 
regulations and define appropriate control measure, in order to reduce waste production and 
pollution. Legislative instruments, particularly “command and control” laws, have become an 
important constraint for manufacturers. In general terms, government intervention can be 
based on two distinct instruments: i) the “command and control” approach, based on direct 
regulation; ii) the use of economic instruments and voluntary programmes. The first solution 
is characterised by a reduced flexibility, because it consists of measures aimed at directly 
influencing  the  environmental  behaviour  of  social  actors.  Indeed,  it  determines  limits, 
restrictions and rules related to specific product and processes. On the contrary, the second 
solution is comparatively more flexible, because it consists of instruments such as taxes, 
tradable quotas, subsidies, covenants and so on.
The interaction of these two forces, public opinion and consumers’ demand, on the one hand, 
and  government  regulation,  on  the  other  hand,  has  had  direct  consequences  on  firms’ 
behaviour and the creation of new markets. Indeed, chemical companies have increasingly 
developed  and  adopted  new  production  technologies  (environmental  technologies,  green 
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processes), and new products (e.g., less polluting solvents and paints). The first reaction to 
these  two  pressures  was  the  development  and  adoption  of  end-of-pipe  and  recycling
technologies. End-of-pipe technologies are purification and treatment plants which do not 
modify the production techniques, but are placed at the end of production processes with the 
aim  of  transforming  wastes  in  less  polluting  or  not  injurious  compounds.  Recycling 
technologies aim at recovering, and transforming wastes so that it might be possible to re-use 
them.  In  recent  days,  chemical  companies  are  increasingly  substituting  end-of-pipe 
intervention with clean technologies. Because they aim at preventing waste and pollution 
production, at reducing resource input and the use of energy, and at using recycled material, 
clean technologies usually demand a partial or radical modification of the process, so that 
pollution is avoided at the source or is reduced thanks to the recovery and valorisation of 
wastes. The redefinition of the chemical process often induces higher efficiency levels, so that 
the  adoption  of  clean  technologies  induces  increases  in  production  efficiency  and  firms 
productivity. 
Against  this  general  background,  some  interesting  differences  emerge  (also  related  to 
different aspects of sectoral systems of innovation and production). As shown in previous 
studies (Arduini and Cesaroni, 2001), differences can be found in terms of countries. For 
instance, German and US chemical firms show a higher innovative rate in (end-of-pipe and 
recycling)  environmental  technologies.  Indeed,  these  two  countries  face  different  public 
pressures and have adopted different government regulations, compared to other countries. As 
a matter of fact, the United States have faced environmental problems through very strict 
standards, and Germany has adopted the most rigid standards of Europe. Moreover, public 
opinion have played an important role in influencing the environmental policy and behaviour 
of firms in both countries. Hence, it seems that rigid environmental standards and strong 
public pressure have a positive influence on the environmental innovative rate of chemical 
firms. Furthermore, by looking at patent statistics, it emerges that the US have a greater 
innovative rate in the recycling technologies than Europe, while Europe is more oriented 
towards end-of-pipe technologies. Europe has a grater innovative rate in the recycling field 
only  by  considering  US  patents.  This  situation  suggests  that  a  larger  market  for  such 
technologies does exist in the US, while European environmental innovative activities are still 
devoted to the development of ex-post (end-of-pipe or recycling) solutions.
A second consequence of the growing attention to environmental issues, has been the birth of 
an intermediate market for environmental technologies and engineering services related to 
environmental  technologies  (the  so-called  Green  Industry).  The  green  industry  began 
developing at the beginning of the 1970s within those countries that introduced environmental 
legislation  and  policies.  The  environmental  regulation  has  been  the  main  factor  of 
development in this industry, and those countries with the strictest regulations are now more 
competitive in this sector and have larger markets. The supply-side of this industry includes 
environmental  equipments,  environmental  services,  and  integrated  environmental 
technologies in industrial processes and cleaner products. The sector is operated by a large 
number of independent, and probably small firms, specialised in the supply of environmental 
services and products. So, similarly to the birth of SEFs providing process technologies in 
chemicals, new environmentally-related SEFs have started to operate (especially in the US), 
thus inducing a division of labour in the environmental innovative activities.
In sum, the example of the environmental technologies seems to show a clear process of co-
evolution. Demand and consumers’ behaviour, and government intervention represented a 
clear incentive for chemical firms to develop and adopt environmentally-safe technologies - 15 -
and to sell green products. The complexity of technical solutions required to implement clean 
technologies, together with the increasing size of the green market, required the intervention 
of  new  agents,  specialised  in  providing  technological  solutions  and  know-how.  As  a 
consequence, two new markets have emerged, one for environmentally-safe products, and the 
other for environmentally-safe technologies.
5. Knowledge base and learning processes: knowledge generation
The discussion carried out in the previous sections has highlighted that one of the main 
characteristics of the chemical sectoral system, compared to other sectors, is the process of 
knowledge creation and diffusion. The competitive position of firms, the organisation of the 
industry, and the linkages between companies and different institutions (e.g., universities) are 
all  influenced  by  the  possibility  of  generating,  transferring  and  using  new  sources  of 
knowledge. Hence, this and the following section will focus on knowledge, but differentiate 
between the processes of knowledge development and knowledge diffusion. In so doing, they 
will take into account the different organisational solutions that chemical firms adopt in the 
two phases. This section is about the exploration of new technologies.
9
During the past decades different modes of managing innovative processes have emerged. 
Particularly,  innovation  is  no  longer  an  activity  conducted  exclusively  inside  the 
organisational  structures  of  large  corporations.  The  empirical  evidence  suggests  that 
technological work and innovations are increasingly the outcome of interactions, formal and 
informal alliances among agents belonging to different economic organisations or institutions. 
This section explores research collaborations that lead to patented inventions in the chemical 
industry, and address the issue of whether geographical proximity matters for establishing 
collaborations among inventors compared to the affiliation to the same firm. It is so possible 
to compare geographical proximity with organisational proximity.
Geographical proximity can be viewed as the fact that inventors are co-localised in the same 
region, while organisational proximity the fact that inventors belong to the same company.
10
By  comparing  geographical  proximity  as  alternative  to  the  organisational  proximity  for 
fostering  R&D collaborations and for producing patents with certain characteristics, it is 
possible to compare the effectiveness of two organisation modes in performing different types 
of research activities: i.e. research that leads to general vs. more specific innovations, or 
research activity that involve sizeable vs. small networks of researchers.
Explicitly, we wanted to explore two propositions: 
1. Organisational proximity (i.e. the firm) is an efficient mechanism for organising research 
collaborations.  We  expect  that  the  effectiveness  of  the  organisation  in  fostering 
collaborations is greater than the benefits arising from geographical proximity.
2. As for geographical proximity as a means for fostering collaboration among inventors, 
we expect that geographical  proximity  is  a  good  coordination  mechanism  when  the 
inventors are localised in a technology intensive region – i.e. in a technological cluster. 
We then expect companies to produce more complex patents in a technological cluster 
than in non-cluster areas.
                                                          
9 The discussion reported in this section is based on Mariani (2000).
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By using the patent information we defined three patent characteristics:
a) Co-localised and De-localised patents (hereafter CL or DL). The address of the inventors 
listed in each patent is assumed to be the actual location of the innovative activity, at least 
for that inventor. At the country level, a patent is termed CL if all the inventors are 
localised in the same nation. If one or more inventors have a different nationality, the 
patent is defined as DL. At the regional level, a patent is CL if all the inventors are 
localised in the same NUTS2 region. By contrast, if at least one of them is localised in a 
different NUTS2 region, the patent is DL. We consider the inventors that produce a DL 
patent as inventors affiliated to the same company.
11
b) Interdisciplinary of patents. The interdisciplinarity of a patent can be proxied by the 
number of supplementary classes in which the patent has been classified by the experts of 
the EPO. Each patent is classified in one main obligatory technological class according to 
the International Patent Classification (IPC). Apart from the principal IPC class, the 
patent officers can assign other supplementary IPC classes, if they believe that the patent 
falls  into  other  technological  classes  as  well.  The  higher  is  the  number  of  these 
supplementary classes, the more the patent is interdisciplinary and “general”. 
c) Breadth of the network. The breadth of the network of inventors is proxied by the number 
of inventors listed in the patents. We use the interdisciplinarity of a patent and the breadth 
of  the  network  that  developed  the  patent  as  indicators  of  the  “quality”  of  the 
collaboration.  Intuitively,  a  higher  coordination  effort  is  needed  when  more 
interdisciplinary patents are developed, and when more inventors are involved.
As a first look at the data, we explored some features of a population of 97,839 chemical 
patents granted by the European Patent Office in 1986-1997 that have been classified in one 
of  the  following  5  chemical  sectors:  biotechnology,  pharmaceuticals,  materials,  organic
chemistry, polymers. While there are few patents with multiple assignees (6.8%), there is a 
great deal of collaboration among individuals (inventors). Only 18.3% of all chemical patents 
are developed by single inventors. The rest (81.7%) are invented by two or more inventors. 
To  a  larger  extent  than  the  networks  of  assignees,  however,  these  networks  are  mostly 
national. Overall, 90.8% of the patents developed by multiple inventors are among individuals 
from the same country. Only 9.2% of patents with multiple inventors involve international 
linkages.
By using this framework and the information collected in patent statistics, we tried to answer 
the  question  of  whether  the  characteristics  of  the  firm  that  produced  the  patent  or  the 
characteristics of the region in which the inventors are located affect the collaborations and 
the features of resulting innovations. Specifically, we assessed whether inventors belonging to 
large multinational firms or located in a technological cluster have a higher probability to 
collaborate, to produce co-localised vs. de-localised patents, and to develop larger networks 
for more interdisciplinary innovations. Put differently, we wanted to ask whether the firm or 
the cluster is a better coordination mode for promoting collaborations among inventors. 
                                                          
11 The logic behind this assumption is the following. Suppose that a patent is CL. A CL patent can be thought of 
as the outcome of the geographical proximity among the inventors.  These are either inventors belonging to the 
same laboratory – and hence to the same firm – or inventors belonging to different firms, and located in the same 
region – i.e. the cluster. Hence, a CL patent can be the outcome of the coordination played either by the firm or 
by the cluster. No distinction can be made by using the information that we have. By contrast, a DL patent is the 
result of the collaboration among inventors localised in different places. This means that the production of a DL 
patent is not the outcome of the geographical proximity among inventors. Since almost all DL patents are 
assigned to single assignees, one can assume that the inventors of a DL patent belong to the same firm. In this 
sense, the invention is the outcome of the organisational proximity as a means to reduce the cost of coordinating 
research networks.- 17 -
5.1 The firm as a co-ordination mode for invention. 
The analysis has been conducted by using a sample of 4,650 patents selected from about 
10,000 chemical patents described in Appendix 1. In order to better investigate the European
dimension, patents were selected when at least one inventor is localised in Europe. Their 
composition  is  as  follows:  159  are  Public  institutions,  excluding  universities;  44  are 
universities; 133 are individual inventors (i.e. assignees who do not belong to any firm); 2,123 
are large firms belonging to the Fortune 500 list (and hence labelled as “Fortune 500” firms). 
The remaining 2,191 firms are not listed in Fortune 500, and have been labelled as “other” 
firms.
One first way to look at whether organisational proximity is a better mechanism for fostering 
research  collaborations  compared  to  the  geographical  proximity  among  inventors,  is  to 
compute the share of DL patents over the total number of patents in the sample. About 38% of 
total patents are DL at the regional level. This share is 13.6% when one considers de-localised 
or co-localised inventors at the country level. Correspondingly, the share of CL patents at the 
regional level is 62% (17% of which are invented by single inventors), and it is 86.4% at the 
national level (16.9% are from single inventors). The higher share of CL compared to DL 
patents is suggestive of the fact that the geographical proximity among inventors might play a 
role in pulling them together. Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish whether this proximity is 
either among inventors belonging to the same firm or among inventors located in the same 
small geographical area. In the case of CL patents, the effect of the firm and the cluster are 
blended together.
However, it is possible to test the first proposition by comparing the characteristics of DL and 
CL patents. Specifically, we computed the mean number of inventors and the mean number of 
supplementary classes of CL patents, and the differences between these means and those in 
DL patents. These means have been used as proxies for “quality” of the coordination activity 
played by firms (in the case of DL patents), and by geographical proximity (in the case of CL 
patents).
Table 1: Characteristics of DL and CL patents.
Share of DL patents over the 
total number of patents in the 
sample
Number of inventors: Mean 
and differences between 
means
Number of supplementary 






















Source: Elaboration from the European Patent Office, 1998
Note: Standard Errors in parenthesis
Table  1  shows  that  the  networks  of  inventors  that  produce  DL  patents,  and  the 
interdisciplinarity  of  these  innovations  are,  on  average, greater than those for the whole 
sample (and, clearly, for CL patents). This suggests that the coordination played by the 
organisational proximity is more effective than the coordination played by the geographical 
proximity among inventors. The low share of DL patents in the sample, however, suggests 
that the vast majority of companies do not have internally the competencies to coordinate 
such collaborations across distances. - 18 -
After looking at the characteristics of DL and CL patents, we checked whether large firms are 
better at producing DL patents. To do so we distinguished between “Fortune 500” and “other” 
firms. Table 2 shows that “Fortune 500” companies produce a higher percentage of DL 
patents than “other” firms. The share of DL patents over the total number of patents invented 
by “Fortune 500” firms is 41.8%, compared to 30.9% of DL patents produced by “others”. 
Moreover, patents assigned to these large multinational companies are produced by a larger 
number  of  inventors  (3.5  inventors  on  average)  and  are  more  interdisciplinary  (2.1 
supplementary classes on average) than patents produced by “other” firms, that, on average, 
are invented by networks composed of 2.9 inventors, and list 1.8 supplementary classes.
Table 2: Firms characteristics vs. patent characteristics.
DL patents: Share over the 
total number of patents 
produced by the two types of 
companies
Number of inventors: Mean 
and differences between 
means
Number of supplementary 
classes: Mean and 
differences between means




















Source: Our elaboration from the EPO data.
Note: Standard Errors in parenthesis. These data do not include universities, government and 
“individual” inventors.
Moreover,  not  only  do  very  large  companies  coordinate  larger  networks  of  inventors  to 
produce more interdisciplinary patents than the “others” but, when patents invented by the 
“Fortune  500”  companies  are  DL,  the  networks  of  inventors  becomes  even  larger.  The 
average number of inventors listed in DL patents produced by “Fortune 500” companies is 
4.3. The number of supplementary classes is 2.2 (not shown here). This suggests that the 
organisational proximity in large multinational companies is more effective than in smaller 
firms. The former can draw on globally dispersed competencies and coordinate inventors 
across distances to produce interdisciplinary patents. 
To sum up, the fact that also “Fortune 500” companies develop more CL patents compared to 
DL patents suggests that geographical proximity matters even for large multinational firms. 
They develop innovations in specific regions or subsidiaries, pulling together competencies 
locally,  at  the  regional  level.  But,  the  greater  share  of  DL  patents  for  “Fortune  500” 
companies  compared  to  “other”  firms,  and  the  higher  average  number  of  inventors  and 
supplementary classes listed in their patents suggest that large internationalised companies 
may also act as global networks for the development of innovations. They can coordinate 
inventors localised in different places. Moreover, when this happens, the coordination played 
by the organisational proximity among inventors is more effective than the geographical 
proximity, as shown by the larger networks of inventors that take part in the project and by the 
greater interdisciplinarity of the innovations. 
5.2 The geographical cluster as a co-ordination mode for invention.
This  section  explores  our  second  proposition.  It  examines  whether  the  technological 
characteristics of the regions in which the inventors are located affect the probability that the 
inventors collaborate, and the characteristics of the outcome patents. Our expectation is that 
geographical proximity in technology-intensive regions give rise to more interdisciplinary 
patents and to larger networks of inventors compared to non cluster regions. The underlining - 19 -
argument is that in technology-intensive regions, where innovative activities agglomerate, it is 
easier to find the specialised and complementary competencies needed in complex R&D 
projects. Moreover, since people with complementary expertise are located very close to one 
another, the probability to collaborate increases. We also expect this probability to be higher 
for smaller and less global firms. These firms might use the advantages of the technological 
cluster  to  compensate  the  lack  of  internal  scientific  competencies  and  coordination 
capabilities.
Firstly, it is important to define a technological cluster. After looking at the distribution of 
different variables across the European regions we decided that the number of chemical 
laboratories – both private and public – was a good proxy for the technological intensity and 
infrastructure developed by a region in the chemical sector. As expected, other variables, such 
as the number of patents invented in each area, are correlated with the number of laboratories. 
Furthermore,  we  checked  that  firms  in  our  database  do  not  determine  themselves  the 
characteristics of the cluster. Indeed, these companies have only a small fraction of total R&D 
laboratories in each region (not shown here). We then defined a cluster according to the 
number of laboratories established in each region.
12
Table 3 shows that the probability of a patent being CL in the technological clusters is higher 
than in non-cluster regions. The probability of CL patents goes from 49.4% in non-cluster 
areas to 66.0% in the “clusters”. The share of DL patents falls correspondingly.
Table 3: Cluster vs. non-cluster regions and patent characteristics
CL patents: Share over the 
total number of patents 
produced in the two types of 
regions
Number of inventors: Mean 
and differences between 
means
Number of supplementary 
classes: Mean and differences 
between means






















Source: Our elaboration from the EPO data.
Note:  Standard  Errors  in  parenthesis.  These  data  do  not  include  universities,  government  and 
“individual” inventors. The number of observations is 3,944.
Table 3 also shows the mean number of inventors and the mean number of supplementary 
classes  of  patents  invented  in  cluster  and  non-cluster  regions.  The  results,  however,  are 
inconclusive,  suggesting  that  being  in  a  cluster  does  not  influence  the  level  of 
interdisciplinarity of a patent and the breadth of the network of inventors. This might be due 
to the fact that the table does not highlight the net effect of being in a cluster over the 
interdisciplinarity and the breadth of the collaboration. To do so one needs to control for other 
factors. 
                                                          
12 The criterion for deciding the threshold between cluster and non-cluster areas is the following. The distribution 
of chemical laboratories in the European regions is very skewed. Our 4,650 patents have been invented in 108 
European regions. The number of chemical laboratories localised in these regions ranges from 0 to 647. Since 
the database on R&D labs in Europe does not provide information on the number of labs in Switzerland, Finland 
and Sweden, the regions from these countries are excluded from the analysis. We then have 91 regions in which 
4,276 patents have been invented, and for which there are information on the number of laboratories that they 
host. Interestingly, however, 67 out of 91 regions host less than 100 laboratories. Only the last quartile of the 
European regions in our sample has between 100 and 647 chemical laboratories. We termed the regions in this 
quartile as the technological clusters.- 20 -
The second proposition also argues that geographical proximity in the cluster is a better 
coordination mechanism for inducing research collaborations when firms do not have the 
organisation capabilities and the scientific competencies needed to develop complex R&D 
projects internally. Table 4 shows the percentage of patents performed in cluster and non 
cluster regions by “other” companies over the total number of patents performed in the two 
types of regions.
Table 4: Technological clusters, firms’ and patents’ characteristics.
Share of patents 
produced by “Fortune 
500”firms in the clusters 
and no-clusters
Share of patents 
produced by the “Other” 
firms in the clusters and 
no-clusters
“Others”
Number of inventors: 























Source: Our elaboration from the EPO data.
Note: Standard Errors in parenthesis. This is the total number of patents in cluster and non-cluster 
regions respectively. The data do not include universities, government and “individual” inventors. The 
number of observations is 3,944.
The probability of a patent being produced by “others” increases from 42.0% in non-cluster 
areas to 50.0% in the clusters. Symmetrically, the probability of a patent being produced by 
“Fortune 500” firms decreases from 58.0% in non-cluster areas to 50.0% in the clusters. This 
data supports the idea that technological clusters are comparatively more attractive for smaller 
and less global firms compared to large MNEs. This suggests that “Fortune 500” firms are 
good mechanisms to coordinate competencies and researchers localised in different firms’ 
units and geographical areas, and that being in a technological cluster might be comparatively 
more beneficial for pulling together localised competencies for smaller firms than for the 
larger ones. Again, however, when we compute the average number of inventors and the 
average number of supplementary classes listed in the patents invented by “other” firms in the 
clusters,  and  compare  them  to  those  invented  in  the  non-cluster  regions,  the  results  are 
inconclusive. The networks of inventors are slightly smaller in the non-cluster areas. The 
interdisciplinarity of the patents is slightly lower for patents invented in the clusters.
6. Knowledge base and learning processes: patterns of technology diffusion
6.1 Separability and transferability as factors fostering the transactions of technologies
Technology transfer and diffusion in the chemical industry is mainly promoted by means of 
market-based interactions, which give rise to a wide market for technologies (especially for 
process technologies). The presence and functioning of this market is based on two main 
conditions:
a) the knowledge base from which innovations are developed, which is generic to several 
applications, and can abstract from specific contexts;
b) the existence of self-reinforcing characteristics of the market for technology in chemicals.
As far as the characteristics of the knowledge base are concerned, the developments in the 
scientific understanding in many chemical disciplines and the progress in the instrumentation 
have caused chemical research to move away from trial-and-error procedures to science-based - 21 -
approaches to industrial research. Scientific discoveries and general principles are the bases to 
“design” new products and processes.
In general terms, the more general and abstract is a piece of knowledge, not linked to the 
people and organisations that develop it, the easier it is to transfer that knowledge to other 
people and organisations that might use it for different purposes. By contrast, as the context 
and firm specificity of knowledge increases, the more it is difficult and costly to transfer that 
knowledge (Arora and Gambardella, 1994). In turn, the possibility of transferring general and 
abstract  knowledge  allows  for  a  division  of  labour  in  innovation,  with  some  firms  or 
institutions  developing  more  general  technologies  and  others  using  them  for  specific 
applications. This opens up different alternative modes for organising the innovative process, 
and allows firms to pursue different strategies to get access to new technologies, from in-
house development to “outsourcing”.
As  for  the  chemical  sector,  the  concept  of  unit  operation,  the  emergence  of  chemical 
engineering, the growing importance of petrochemicals, and the increase in the scale and 
complexity of chemical plants led to the rise of a new market for engineering and process 
design services for chemical plants. In particular, the development of chemical engineering as 
an academic discipline made it easier to separate the process design from the details of the 
compound being produced in the plants. In turn, the codification of process technologies and 
the rise of specialised technology suppliers led to a vertical division of labour in the chemical-
processing sector. Process technology was made into a “commodity” that could be traded due 
to general-purpose nature of the knowledge exchanged. Put differently, a market for process 
technology  developed  because  the  technology  traded  was  nothing  else  than  general  and 
abstract knowledge that could be applied to different applications and markets. 
This market for technological knowledge in the chemical sector was operated by a large 
number  of  small  specialised  and  technology-based  firms,  the  SEFs,  which  has  been  an 
original and persistent feature of the American chemical industry. With a few exceptions, the 
SEFs did not develop radically new processes. They were good at moving down the learning 
curve  for  processes  invented  by  the  large  oil  and  chemical  companies.  And,  equally 
important, they acted as independent licensors on behalf of other firms’ technology. 
It is also worth noting that the SEFs started as an American phenomenon.
13 This was because 
the large size of the market has been a crucial factor for the rise of SEFs (Freeman, 1968). By 
the end of World War II, the world demand of chemical products grew – especially of 
petrochemicals – and pushed companies to raise the scale of production. The large scale 
increased the size and complexity of the plants, so that companies often faced a technological 
capability constraint, and demanded the intervention of external engineering specialists. 
Finally, the existence of the SEFs, whose business is to sell process technologies and to 
appropriate rents from innovations, encouraged other chemical and oil firms to license their 
own technologies for making profits out of them. This closely relates to the second condition 
(i.e., the presence of a self-reinforcing mechanism) that allowed the market for technology 
in the chemicals to persist over time.
The  traditional  and  managerial  literature  (among  others,  see  Teece,  1988)  holds  that 
companies can gain value from their innovations mainly by exploiting them in-house. There 
                                                          
13 According to Freeman (1968), 50% of the total value of engineering contracts world-wide in 1960-66 were 
done by American SEFs.- 22 -
are many reasons why technology licensing is considered an undesirable strategy. Apart from 
the existence of transaction costs problems, and of cognitive constraints, the main reason is 
that by licensing, firms create new competitors in the downstream product market, hence 
reducing their profits and dissipating rents. In other words, firms incur in the rent dissipation 
effect, which consists in the erosion of profits due to another firm competing in downstream 
market. But licensing also provides revenues from the sale of technologies (the revenue 
effect), in the form of licensing payments. Hence, the question is under what conditions the 
revenue effect is greater than the rent dissipation effect, so that of inducing licensing (Arora 
and Fosfuri, 1999).
The answer to this question mainly depends on industry structure, and especially on the 
presence of a situation of monopoly or competition in the product market. In the case of the 
chemical  sector,  technology  licensors  that  lack  the  downstream  complementary  assets  in 
production and commercialisation sell more licenses – in this case, the rent dissipation effect 
is zero. However, in the presence of such licensors, downstream producers may be induced to 
license their technologies as well. In fact, given that the licensing activity of others create new 
competitors in any case, and hence reduces the capability to gain profits in the product 
market, the downstream producers may well have incentives in competing in the market for 
technologies, by selling their proprietary technologies. And this is what exactly happened in 
the chemical sector.
The  SEFs  acted  as  independent  technology  suppliers,  by  selling  process  technologies  to 
potential entrants in the product markets, and in turn this behaviour induced downstream 
chemical companies to become technology suppliers as well. Moreover, licensing by rivals in 
the downstream markets increased the propensity of other chemical companies to license their 
proprietary technologies as well. In this sense, licensing strategies tend to strengthen over 
time (i.e., there are self-reinforcing mechanisms). As a matter of fact, once established, the 
market for technology tends to persist over time. Indeed, in the chemical sector the market for 
process technologies has been a constant feature over the last forty years. Even today, Arora 
and Fosfuri (2000), using data on worlwide technology licensing during the 1980s, find that 
homogeneous sectors like air separation, pulp and paper, and petrochemicals are characterised 
by  extensive  licensing.  On  the  contrary,  in  differentiated  product  groups  like  organic 
chemicals, licensing is quite limited. Furthermore, they find that in those sub-sectors where 
firms without downstream assets license more, large chemical producers themselves tend to 
license more.
6.2 Evidence on the existence of markets for technological knowledge
The existence of a market for process technologies, the role of SEFs, and the behaviour of 
large chemical companies has already been introduced in the previous discussion. In this 
section we will try to describe this market in greater detail, both by comparing different 
means  for  transferring  technological  knowledge  in  chemicals,  and  by  taking  into 
consideration country characteristics.
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By  using  information  from  the  Chem-Intell  database,  we  firstly  looked  at  the  country 
distribution of the licensors of 5,442 licensing agreements that were signed in the US, Europe, 
                                                          
14 An extensive analysis on this issue can be found in Cesaroni and Mariani (2001).- 23 -
Japan  and  Germany.
15  We  were  able  to  distinguish  between  four  kinds  of  technology 
suppliers:
a) top chemical companies – those ranking in the top 50 positions in terms of number of 
plants owned and reported in the dataset;
b) other chemical companies – those owning more than 5 plants, but not top companies;
c) SEFs;
d) staff – the case in which firms developed internally their process technologies.
Table 5: Licensing agreements: 1980-1997 (Shares of Total Licenses by Type of Licensor and Region)
Receiving Country
Licensor Germany UK Japan US Total
Top Chem. Firms 1.7 1.4 2.7 3.7 9.5
Other Chem. Firms 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.8
SEFs 8.9 8.3 10.4 23.3 50.9
Staff 7.4 5.6 9.5 16.3 38.8
Total 18.1 15.5 22.8 43.6 100.00
Source: Chem-Intell, 1998.
Table 5 shows that SEFs are the most important source of chemical processes technologies in 
all the developed countries. They own 50.9% of the total market for technology. Half of the 
transactions are in the US (23.3%), followed by in-house technology development (16.3%). 
However, when one considers the frequencies of SEFs transactions and in-house technology 
development conditional upon each receiving country, these shares are very similar. In all the 
four countries, about 50% of technologies are supplied by SEFs, and 40% by companies’ 
staff. This suggests that, apart from using its own technology expertise, chemical companies 
often  rely  on  the  specialised  suppliers  of  process  technologies.  In  order  to  analyse  the 
phenomenon in greater detail, table 6 looks at the type of companies involved in the vertical 
linkages.
Table 6: Licensing agreements: 1980-1997 (Shares of Total Licenses by Type of Licensor and 
Licensee)
Receiving Company
Licensor Top Chem. Firms Other Chem. Firms “Non” Chem. Firms *  Total
Top Chem. Firms 1.6 6.9 2.7 11.2
Other Chem. Firms 0.2 0.9 0.4 1.5
SEFs 9.3 39.8 19.1 68.2
Staff 8.6 8.8 1.7 19.1
Total 19.7 56.4 23.9 100.00
* “Non” Chemical Companies: Companies with 5 or less than 5 plants.
Source: Chem-Intell, 1998.
Table 6 confirms that SEFs are the main suppliers of technologies in the chemical sector –
they cover the 68.2% of the total market for licensing. This is true for all types of companies 
with at least one plant. The SEFs license almost 50% of the technologies used by the top 
chemical firms, 70% of the know-how used by the companies with at least 5 chemical plants, 
and 80% of the technology used by the companies with less than 5 plants. Top chemical 
companies have the lowest share of technology received from the SEFs, probably due to their 
higher technological capabilities developed in-house. This is confirmed by table 6. Not only 
                                                          
15 The Chem-Intell database collects information on 36,343 plants built world-wide since 1980. For each plant, a 
number of detailed information are present: kind of production realised, production capacity, technology used, 
owner of the plant, contractor which provided the engineering services, licensor, construction year, and so on. It 
is so possible to identify the existence of repetitive patterns between different agents (chemical companies and 
specialised suppliers) and to test the existence of the degree of persistence.- 24 -
top chemical companies develop by themselves almost half of their technological know-how, 
but they also sell these technologies to other chemical companies. 
The role of SEFs in licensing is further analysed in table 7. Although the SEFs started as an 
American phenomenon, table 7 shows that other countries are now successfully competing 
with the US in this field, particularly in Europe and the third-world markets. However, while 
the US SEFs have a sizable share of the European market, the European SEFs have only a 
small share of the US market.




USA West Europe Japan Rest of the 
World
Share of Total 
World Market
USA  18.0 10.3 6.5 16.9 15.1
West Germany 3.1 11.3 1.0 10.2 8.8
UK 1.2 3.0 2.7 1.4 2.4
Italy 0.1 1.4 0.0 2.2 1.6
France 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.9 0.7
Japan 0.1 0.1 1.5 1.1 0.7
Source: Chemical Age Profile (Arora and Gambardella, 1998).
In particular, table 7 shows that the market share of US SEFs in licensing is about 15%, 
followed by West Germany with a share of 8.8%. However, if one looks at the share of US 
licenses in Europe and Japan with respect to the correspondent shares of her competitors, the 
comparative advantage of US SEFs in licensing is even more apparent.
Finally, by using information drawn from the SDC database, we tried to estimate the “value” 
of the licensing market in chemicals during the period 1990-1997.
16 Results are reported on 
table 8.
Table 8: Licenses: value and number by sector: 1990-1997 (Millions of dollars)
Estimated Value per 
License
Nr. of Licenses Total Value per Sector
General Chemicals 104.2 248 25,835.4
Pharmaceuticals 117.4 1,394 163,606.7
Soaps & Cosmetics 3.0 29 87.0
Rubber & Plastics 3.0 41 123.0
Petroleum Refining 6.2 33 203.2
Average  46.7 349 16,298.3
Source: SDC, 1998.
In order to calculate the values, we proceeded as follows. We first considered the whole SDC 
database (52,000 transactions), and selected the licensing agreements that disclosed the unit 
value. We then attributed each license to one of the 5 industrial sectors shown in table 8. For 
each of these 5 sectors we computed the average value of a license (first column on the left).
17
We then calculated the number of licenses by sector and, based on the estimated mean value 
                                                          
16 The SDC database (Securities Data Company, 1998) and Chem-Intell (1998). The SDC database typically 
reports product licenses. The database is constructed from SEC filings (10-Qs), financial journals, news wire 
services, proxies and quarterly reports. There are information on about 52,000 inter-firm agreements world-wide 
in all sectors. For each transaction there are information on the type of agreement (i.e. license, joint R&D, joint 
manufacturing, etc.), whether the agreement involves a technology transfer, the number of partners involved, the 
sector, the country and the region of the transaction. Data are available from 1990 to 1997.
17 In two cases –  i.e. soap and cosmetics, and rubber and plastics – we had to few observations (less than 5 licenses). Instead 
of calculating the mean value, we considered the median value of the whole sample of alliances.- 25 -
per license, we computed the total amount of money involved in the exchange of knowledge 
in the 5 sectors (first column on the right).
Table  8  shows  that  the  pharmaceutical  sector  reports  the  highest  number  of  licensing 
agreements and the highest value per alliance, and hence moves the largest amount of money. 
By contrast, in the general chemical sector, licensing agreements tend to be less numerous, 
although the unit value is rather high. The market for knowledge seems to be less developed 
in soaps and cosmetics, rubber and plastics and petroleum refining, where both the number 
and the unit value of agreements are low compared to the other sectors in table 8.
6.3 Licensing strategies by large companies
There are quite a few examples in the chemical industry showing that firms increasingly 
choose to license their technologies. Companies such as Union Carbide, Amoco, Montedison, 
Phillips, Exxon and British Petroleum have been important technology suppliers. Also some 
leading  chemical  producers  such  as  Dow  Chemical,  DuPont,  Monsanto  and  Hoechst, 
traditionally reluctant to license, recently started to sell proprietary technologies. This section 
analyses technology strategies of the 40 largest corporations from Western Europe, North 
America  and  Japan.
18  We  selected  from  Chem-Intell  all  the  plants  in  which  these  40 
companies appeared as technology licensors. Figure 1 shows the name of the companies, and 
the  share  of  technologies that they exploit in-house (Staff) or license out to other firms 
(Licens).
Figure 1 shows that large corporations license a large amount of their proprietary processing 
technologies. On average, 52.5% of internally developed technologies are sold to other firms. 
However, differences emerge among companies. Firms such as Air Liquide, Mitsubishi and 
Texaco license more than 80% of their proprietary technologies. On the other extreme, Nestle 
sells only a small share of its technologies, and Grupo Torras and Enterprises des Recherchers 
exploit their technologies only internally.
This suggests that firms adopt different technological strategies. For example, Exxon and 
Union Carbide have the same number of technologies, but show different strategies toward 
licensing. Union Carbide licenses about 70% of process technologies, while Exxon uses the 
same share of technologies for internal production purposes.
Interestingly, Figure 1 also shows that there is a high share of technologies (20.4%) that firms 
both  exploit  in-house  and  license  out  to  other  firms.  In  so  doing  they  license  process 
technologies to potential competitors, thus reducing expected profits in the product market.
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Also in this case, there are differences among firms. For example, companies like Allied 
Signal, Enterprises de Recherches and Nestle do not have technologies that are both licensed 
and used internally. Others, such as BOC and Solvay, use for both internal and external 
purposes about 50% of their technologies.
The question is then: why should (chemical) companies license their technologies to other 
companies in the same market? What are the specific features of the chemical industry that 
made  licensing  by  large  companies  so  diffused?  In  general  terms  (and  for  sectors  also 
different from chemicals), Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (2000) suggest that the decision on 
whether licensing or exploiting the technology in-house depends on three main factors. First, 
                                                          
18 Firm size is measured by the total number of plants as reported by Chem-Intell.
19 One should take into account the geographical localisation of the licensee, and the possibility that the markets of the 
licensor and the licensee are geographically different. In this case, the companies would not compete in the same market.- 26 -
if the firm has distinctive complementary assets in production and marketing, compared to 
other competing firms, the efficient strategy is in-house exploitation of technology. On the 
contrary, licensing might become the right strategy, in order to acquire some rents from 
innovation. Second, the decision also depends on the nature and importance of the transaction 
costs involved in the exchange of complementary assets, compared with the importance of 
transaction costs involved in selling or licensing the technology. If the latter are greater than 
the former, a company without the needed complementary assets may choose to acquire those 
assets in the specialised market, and then exploit the technology in-house.  This  strategy 
allows firms to save resources, compared with the strategy of licensing, because of the smaller 
amount  of  transaction  costs.  Finally,  firms  may  choose  to  license  their  proprietary 
technologies instead of exploiting them in-house, because of the extent of competition in the 
final  product  market.  The  degree  of  competition  influences  the  capability  for  firms  of 
extracting returns, so that the “best strategy” is to operate in the market (technology vs. 
product market) with the smaller level of competition.
However, what we claim is that what induced large chemical companies to start licensing out 
their  process  technologies  were  specific  conditions  of  sectoral  system  described  in  the 
previous sections. Among others, characteristics of the knowledge base in chemicals, and the 
role and licensing activity of SEFs – acting as independent technology suppliers to potential 
entrants  –  were  key  in  inducing  large  chemical  companies  to  license  out  their  process 
technologies. In other words, while technology licensing by large firms might be potentially 
observable in different sectors and industries, the evolution (and co-evolution) of all elements 
of the chemical sectoral system made this potentiality become feasible in chemicals. In this 
sense, the sectoral dimension implicit in the Sectoral System approach is clearly relevant.
7. Conclusions
The objective of this study was to assess the different dimensions of the chemical sectoral 
system. In some respect, chemicals provide an excellent basis for analysing this issue. In the 
first place, this is a very important and innovative industry in all advanced countries, and 
worldwide as well. Second, this is an industry whose almost 200 years history provides an 
opportunity to examine the evolution and co-evolution processes that involved single agents 
(both  inventors,  firms  and  research  institutes),  the  relationships  among  agents,  and  the 
industry as a whole. Third, being the chemical industry a science-based industry, it gives the 
opportunity to explore in depth the processes of technology creation and diffusion, and the 
role of knowledge in shaping companies performances and industry organisation.
Indeed, the history of the industry can be characterised by the presence of a series of big 
discontinuities. The dyestuff model, the development of polymer chemistry (i.e., the science 
of chemical products), and the chemical engineering (i.e., the science of chemical processes) 
were major changes in the knowledge sphere. The shift from coal to petrochemicals in the 
years  before  the  Second  World  War  had  strong  consequences  on  regional  leadership  in 
chemicals,  and  allowed  the  American  chemical  industry  to  catch  up  with  Europe.  The 
emergence of specialised engineering firms (SEFs) made it easier the outsourcing of process 
technologies and allowed a growing division of labour at the industry level between SEFs and 
chemical companies. The world demand decrease during the 1980s induced a process of 
industry restructuring.
However, the history of the chemical industry is also characterised by a big continuity in 
companies’ life, which were able to evolve and compete over time. BASF, Bayer, Hoechst, - 27 -
ICI, Agfa, ICI, i.e. some of the leading chemical companies nowadays, have more than one 
hundred years history and have been top chemical producers during all this period. This 
means  that  between  small  and  large  companies,  markets,  research  institutions  and  other 
organisations there has been a process of co-evolution, with firms playing the central role 
within the chemical system.
It is possible to explore some of the relevant trends of this system:
- the more and more frequent linkages between firms and universities;
- the increasing role of networks;
- the increasing division of labour at the industry level between chemical companies and 
technology suppliers;
- the increasing relationships with users, in order to better specify products characteristics;
- the increasing role of knowledge and R&D as a source of competitive advantages and 
growth.
Among these dimensions, this study explored especially the role of knowledge, by focusing 
on the mechanisms for knowledge generations and for knowledge (technology) diffusion. As 
far as knowledge generation is concerned, we compared the firm and the technological cluster 
as organisational modes for producing innovations. In this respect, the results confirm a major 
role for large firms. Indeed, the larger the firm is:
- the  lower  is  the  probability  that  inventors  are  co-localised,  i.e.  the  innovation  is 
developed by inventors localised in the same place;
- the largest is the network of inventors that collaborate to produce a patent;
- the higher is the number of supplementary classes listed in the patent, i.e. the higher is the 
interdisciplinarity of the patent.
However,  for  smaller  companies  there  exists  a  comparative  advantage  of  being  in  a 
technological cluster, for it typically features a good deal of different and complementary 
competencies inside the same territorial area. Therefore, firms localised in a technological 
cluster have limited need for finding these competencies outside the region. Furthermore, 
from a comparative viewpoint, geographical proximity in a technological intense region plays 
a  more  important  coordination  function  for  companies  that  lack  the  internal  scientific 
competencies  and  the  organisational  capabilities  needed  to  coordinate  the  R&D 
collaborations. In this sense, geographical proximity is a good substitute for the organisational 
proximity.
Once the technology has been developed, large companies play a critical role as well. Indeed, 
the traditional managerial literature has considered large companies as the locus where the 
phases of technology development and use are naturally integrated – i.e., large companies 
develop new technologies mainly for internal production needs. In the last years, however, 
large firms in chemicals have enlarged the spectrum of strategic options, and have increased 
their propensity to license out proprietary technologies to other firms. In so doing, they can be 
considered one of the main actors of that market for (process) technologies that begun with 
the appearance of the specialised engineering firms during the 1960s in the US.
Why in chemicals? This study clearly showed that the answer lies in the knowledge base of 
the sector and the process of increasing codificability and transferability that has characterised 
the  chemical  sector  over  the  time.  The  advances  in  the  chemical  discipline  (polymer 
chemistry and chemical engineering) have created the bases for a greater codificability. And 
firms’  behaviour  has  enhanced  the  transferability  of  chemical  technologies.  As  a  result, - 28 -
however, technological knowledge has become a central feature of the chemical sectoral 
system, which capable of influencing firms’ competitive advantages, industry structure, the 
relationships between different institutions, and their evolution over time.- 29 -
Figure 1: Use of proprietary technologies (largest European, North American and Japanese 
companies)
Source: Chem-Intell, 1998
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Appendix 1. The networks of inventors: data description.
The data used in Section 3 of this paper are drawn from various sources. First, from the 
European Patent Office (EPO,  1998),  we  extracted  a  database of 201,531 chemical 
patents  granted  and  applied  between  1986-1997.  From  this  universe  of  patents  we 
selected  a  random  sample  of  10,000  chemical  patents  and  classified  them  in  5 
technological classes: biotechnology, materials, organic chemistry, pharmaceuticals and 
polymers. The correspondence table between IPC technological classes in these 5 classes 
is provided by Rossana Pammolli.
From all the information available in the front page of a patent document we collected 
the following details on each chemical patent: the number, names and addresses of the 
assignees; the number, name and addresses of the inventors; the obligatory IPC class, 
and the number and type of supplementary IPC classes; the date of the patent application. 
We did not make any distinction between patent applications that have been granted, and 
those that have not been granted (yet).
The  first  step  of  the  preparation  of  the  patent  data  was  to  locate  the  invention 
geographically. For the 10,000 sample patents, the address of the inventor was used to 
assign each inventor to a specific country. Each patent was then defined as CL or DL at 
the country level. The number of assignees, the number of inventors, and the number of 
supplementary classes were also calculated, so to define the breadth of the networks of 
assignees and inventors, and the level of interdisciplinary of the patents.
The second step was to consider the patents (in the 10,000 sample patents) in which at 
least  one  inventor  is  located  in  Europe.  By  using  the  information  on  the  zip  code 
contained in the addresses, we assigned the inventors of 4,650 patents to a specific 
NUTS3, NUT2, and NUT1 region, and decided whether a patent was CL or DL at the 
regional level. Again, the number of assignees, the number of inventors, and the number 
of supplementary classes were calculated. 
The names of the applicants of these 10,000 patents were standardised in order to merge 
mother and daughter firms under the same name. The Who Owns Whom (1995) database 
was used to investigate these mother-daughter relations. Fortune 500 (1995) was used to 
select the firms that we termed “Fortune 500”.
We  also  collected  information  about  the  NUTS3  regions  in  which  the  inventors  were 
located.
20 From the EUROSTAT REGIO database (1999) we collected information about the 
economic characteristics of these regions, such as the GDP, the population, the size of the 
regions, etc. We also downloaded some 9,000 chemical laboratories from the European R&D 
database (by Reed Elsevier Publisher, 1996). The laboratories were classified as private labs 
if they were firms' laboratories, or public labs if they were government research institutions, 
universities, and hospitals. They were also assigned to their specific NUTS3 regions.
                                                          
20 When the inventors were CL, the NUTS3 region where the patent was invented was obviously the region 
where all the inventors were located. When the inventors were DL, we considered the region where more than 
50% of the inventors were located. In the few cases in which this 50% was not reached, we used the region of 
the first inventor listed in the patent.- 31 -
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